![]() Logical behaviorism is usually interpreted as a form of semantic behaviorism. By contrast, logical behaviorism seems to be a version of semantic behaviorism, a thesis about the meaning of mentalistic terms. The standard account of the relation between logical behaviorism and psychology is that the logical behaviorism provides the philosophical foundations for psychological behaviorism. Eliminative behaviorism is the attempt to deny or eliminate mentalistic terms by claiming there are no mental entities to which mentalistic terms refer. It distinguishes five varieties of behaviorism-methodological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, analytic behaviorism, eliminative behaviorism, and interpretative behaviorism. This chapter presents an overview on logical behaviorism. Future applications of temporal experience tracing are discussed, including the study of temporal dynamics of continuous states of consciousness and the integration of the experience dynamics with neural dynamics. This study is the first of its kind, combining a quantitative analysis of phenomenological structures in time with a data-driven approach to the study of neural correlates of mental states. Furthermore, we did not find an effect of mindfulness training on the classification accuracy of subjective experience states, suggesting that this method can capture aspects of the true underlying experiences even in untrained participants. Supporting the idea of inter-individual phenomenological similarity, neural markers associated with high classification accuracies strongly overlapped between the two groups. Finally, using univariate classifications, the neural features enabling correct binary classifications of experience states are studied. ![]() These features enabled classification of the data-driven experience clusters in unseen meditation sessions from known participants in both meditation groups, while the meditation style could only be classified in the more experienced participant group, the Home meditation group. From low-density portable EEG recordings, 98 neural features were computed, including spectral features, connectivity measures and information theoretic measures. We found both meditation style-specific experience states, as well as a cluster of difficulties experienced with the practice. The traces revealed common experience states with transition dynamics shared between the participant groups. I present the results from two groups practising three styles of mindfulness meditation in either a 3-day Retreat setting, or over several months in their own homes. This method requires participants to retrospectively graph the intensity of an experience along several phenomenological dimensions over time. In this thesis, I introduce Temporal Experience Tracing as a method for capturing continuous subjective experiences. Overall, the review concludes that radical behaviorism differs from both cognitive psychology and mediational neobehaviorism, which radical behaviorism regards as comparably mentalistic.Ī recurring problem for the study of the neural correlates of conscious experience states is the lack of continuous measures for first-person reports. Finally, the review summarizes the radical behaviorist opposition to mentalism. ![]() The review then considers some sources of mentalism, along with examples of how mentalism is supported in philosophy. Part 2 continues the review of mentalism by addressing the relations among mentalism, operationism, and the meaning of scientific verbal behavior, especially when the verbal behavior involves private behavioral events. ![]() Part 1 further suggested that mentalism is actually as integral to mediational neobehaviorism as it is to cognitive psychology, even though each claims to differ from the other. For mentalism, an explanation should properly focus on specifying the causal role of the mediator, rather than talking about observable relations. One of those functions is inferred to be mediation, in which environmental events trigger a mediating state or process, which in turn triggers a response. These causal mental states and processes are inferred to reside in an unobservable dimension beyond that in which behavior occurs, and to function differently from environmental events, variables, and relations. Part 1 of this review suggested that mentalism consists in explanations of behavior in terms of causal mental states and processes.
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